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Why does disclosure continue to be seen as a panacea for failings in corporate governance, 
despite mounting evidence that it is a weak instrument of control? Through a micro-historical 
study of the constitution and deliberations of the Greenbury committee, which placed 
executive remuneration disclosure at the heart of UK corporate governance, we demonstrate 
how disclosure was discursively constructed by elite business leaders as a primary 
requirement of accountability of agents to owners. Our research, conducted twenty years after 
the publication of the Greenbury recommendations in 1995, is based on oral history 
interviews with surviving members of the committee and its professional advisers, who came 
to lament that their efforts perversely had helped escalate rather than moderate top executive 
pay. We argue that disclosure is a poor surrogate for real engagement by owners in corporate 









The foundations of the contemporary United Kingdom (UK) system of corporate 
governance were laid in the 1990s. The Cadbury committee reported in 1992, recommending 
separation of the roles of chief executive and chairperson to prevent granting ‘unfettered 
powers’ (Cadbury, 1992, s. 1.2, s. 4.9) to a single individual, and other reforms to limit 
possibilities for self-aggrandizement by management. To help restore confidence in the 
corporate sector and accounting profession following a series of corporate failures and 
perceived abuses, Cadbury introduced new standards and structures on a ‘comply or explain’ 
basis (Shrives & Brennan, 2017; Spira & Slinn, 2013). Cadbury side-stepped the issue of 
executive pay, but recommended that companies establish remuneration committees 
composed of non-executive directors (NEDs), since, as a matter of principle, executives 
should not be involved in decisions affecting their own pay (Main & Johnston, 1993). From 
Cadbury onwards, officer accountability, procedural transparency and disclosure of 
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information have been widely regarded as fundamental to good governance (Maclean, 
Harvey, & Press, 2006). Indeed, later corporate governance reforms are best interpreted as 
refinements, elaborations or additions to the accountability-transparency-disclosure approach 
pioneered by Cadbury; who regarded disclosure as ‘the key to informed market regulation’ 
(Cadbury, 2013, p. x). The UK combined code of corporate governance is, in essence, an 
incrementally additive set of precepts that constitute a regime of elite corporate self-
regulation, responsive to but not directly challenged by political factions or public interest 
groups (Price, Harvey, Maclean, & Campbell, 2018). 
The first major enhancement to Cadbury stemmed from the report of the Greenbury 
committee or ‘study group’, as it was formally termed, published in 1995. This was 
established under the aegis of the Confederation of British Industry (CBI) in response to 
widespread public concern at sharply rising levels of private-sector executive pay. Following 
extensive deliberations and evidence gathering, Greenbury sought to address ‘important 
issues about accountability’ and avoid repeating recent ‘mistakes and misjudgements’ 
(Greenbury, 1995, p. 10) by strengthening the link between pay and performance and 
insisting on the establishment of remuneration committees by companies listed on the 
London Stock Exchange (LSE). Remuneration committees, composed of notionally 
independent NEDs, were now tasked with recommending fit-for-purpose reward packages for 
top executives and for disclosing relevant information in the company’s annual report 
(Greenbury, 1995: pp. 14-18). Greenbury believed that disclosing the components and total 
value of remuneration packages would thereby both limit and justify executive pay. 
Sir Richard Greenbury, executive chairman of Marks & Spencer, was appointed chair 
of the committee in recognition of his reputation as a socially responsible business leader 
committed to serving the public interest (Maclean, 1999). He was given considerable sway in 
selecting and recruiting other study group members, and supported by professional advisors 
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and a secretariat to assist in the process of gathering evidence and reviewing options. The 
Greenbury Report (1995) represents one of the earliest regulatory initiatives in the UK to 
address public concern over ‘excessive’ levels of executive remuneration. Greenbury 
explicitly recognized that his study group was established in response to the backlash against 
those ‘remuneration packages [that] have attracted most public attention’ (Greenbury, 1995, 
s. 1.4), especially the criticisms levelled against the chief executive officers (CEOs) of public 
utilities, whose remuneration had escalated following privatization (Conyon, 1995; Maclean, 
1999). In 1995, after a rush of stories in the British press charging utility CEOs with 
opportunism and greed, the government, with an election looming, responded to the furore by 
asking Greenbury to recommend options for reform, while opposing regulation, which it 
considered ‘more likely to hinder than improve governance’ (Forker, 1992, p. 111). 
 The study group reported in the summer of 1995 and its recommendations, endorsed 
by government, were introduced later that year under listing rules for LSE-listed companies. 
The main Greenbury provisions were eventually incorporated into the UK combined code of 
corporate governance, and its main provisions have been retained in all subsequent editions. 
Moreover, because the UK code impacts on similar codes in a number of Commonwealth 
countries, its influence has been widespread. The substantive provisions of Greenbury were 
eventually incorporated in UK statute under the The Large and Medium-sized Companies and 
Groups (Accounts and Reports) (Amendment) Regulations 2013. 
This article is focused on the efficacy of information disclosure as an instrument of 
corporate governance. Experience post-Greenbury suggests that disclosing the details of 
executive remuneration has not achieved the goal of moderating increases in executive pay 
relative to average earnings (CIPD, 2018; Clarke, Jarvis, & Gholamshahi, 2018). Rather, 
disclosure, far from shaming those responsible for devising remuneration packages into 
limiting executive pay, has been implicated in ratcheting up levels of remuneration across the 
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corporate sector. The demand for ever more disclosure of information by corporate 
governance reformers might in this respect have lent impetus to the tendency for executive 
pay to outstrip that of other employees. In what follows, we seek answers to three questions. 
First, how did the Greenbury committee come to recommend disclosure as the best means of 
justifying and controlling the remuneration of top corporate executives? Second, how do 
surviving members of the study group reflect on the continuing escalation in top executive 
pay post-Greenbury? Third, how might our findings and those of other researchers contribute 
to realizing increased accountability? 
Our paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, we examine the historical context 
of Greenbury’s recommendations for better aligning top executive pay with organizational 
performance and, related to this, for increasing accountability through disclosure. Next, we 
review the related literatures on executive remuneration and corporate performance, 
remuneration committees, the impact of disclosure on pay, and shareholder engagement in 
pay setting to introduce the conceptual apparatus underpinning our subsequent empirical 
analyses. We then outline our methodology and explain our intention and approach in 
interviewing Greenbury committee members and advisers. Three findings sections follow. 
First, we report on a discourse analysis of our interviews that reveals how and why disclosure 
emerged as the favoured solution to the accountability problem Greenbury was mandated to 
solve. Second, we analyse how our interviewees make sense of the failure of the committee 
to achieve its primary objective. Third, we draw upon our data to elucidate four conditions 
that, if satisfied, might strengthen the accountability relationship between executives and 
owners. We draw out the implications of the paper in our discussion and conclusion. 
2. Greenbury context, process and recommendations 
The early 1990s was a time of ferment for the UK economy, marked by recession and 
the privatization of utilities and state-owned enterprises by a cash-strapped government led 
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by Prime Minister John Major, who held office between 1990 and 1997. A spate of corporate 
collapses like that of the Bank of Credit and Commerce International in July 1991, which 
revealed that its directors had hidden information from auditors and falsified accounts over 
several years, fuelled concerns about the quality of audit procedures and the accuracy of 
corporate financial reports, provoking a crisis of confidence within the accounting profession 
and extensive debate on ‘how to restore confidence in financial reporting and the audit 
process’ (Spira & Slinn, 2013, p.  42). It is in this ‘climate of concern’ that the Cadbury 
committee on the financial aspects of corporate governance was established in May 1991 to 
help remedy ‘loose accounting standards, uncertainty over the control responsibilities of 
directors, and competitive pressures on companies and auditors to present results in line with 
published forecasts’ (Cadbury, 2013, p. vi). However, when the theft of £440 million from 
the Mirror Group pension fund by the late Robert Maxwell hit the headlines following his 
death in November 1991, the committee had ‘unavoidably to widen its remit from the 
financial aspects of corporate governance to corporate governance itself, and the 
responsibilities and composition of boards’ (Cadbury, 2013, p. vi). Cadbury finally reported 
and issued recommendations in December 1992 following extensive consultation on draft 
proposals issued the previous May. The report has made a seminal contribution, within the 
UK and beyond, to the practice of corporate governance, as Nordberg and McNulty (2013, p. 
362) observe: ‘The legacy of the Cadbury report is how its language has come to define 
corporate governance’. Crucially, it set a precedent for how issues of corporate governance 
should be dealt with in future; not through formal legislation, but by a model of consultation 
leading to codes of best practice backed by the veiled threat of legislation (Jones & Pollitt, 
2004). 
The Cadbury report, however, did little immediately to stem disquiet about commonly 
perceived failings of corporate governance. In particular, the thorny question of executive 
 6
pay rose to prominence when many of the former civil servants running privatized public 
utilities, re-styled as corporate sector CEOs, were awarded sharp increases in pay to reflect 
their new status as private sector business leaders. The resulting sense of injustice was 
compounded through the operation of share option schemes that realized large gains as utility 
share prices escalated following privatization (Conyon, 1995; Greenbury, 1995, pp. 49-52). 
Especially noteworthy was the case of former British Gas CEO, Cedric Brown, whose salary 
rose 75% to £475,000 in 1994, then equivalent to 47 times the average pay of British Gas 
employees (Ward, 1995, p. 17). How, it was asked, could this be justified when British Gas 
operated a virtual monopoly and provided a commodity on which millions of ordinary 
Britons relied? The British Gas AGM of 1995 lasted six hours and was attended by over 
4,600 shareholders (Maclean, 1999). The Communication Workers’ Union (CWU) brought 
along a live pig named Cedric to underline their point that Cedric Brown had his ‘snout in the 
trough’ (Maitland, 2008). The British Gas affair has endured in popular memory as a cause 
célèbre illustrative of ethical laxity (Bender, 2003). Issues framed in particular ways in the 
media can thus ‘determine the strategies used to develop or contest understandings’ (Black, 
2002, p. 196). In other words, remedies are often designed to resolve specific issues taken as 
emblematic of more general problems. 
 What had emerged by 1995 was a general consensus that something must be done to 
strengthen the Cadbury code to help resolve the troublesome issue of executive pay, and in 
doing so head off the threat of government interference in private sector affairs. How Sir 
Richard Greenbury came to lead the proposed study group on remuneration setting is telling. 
The initiative stemmed not from the CBI as convening organization, but from the incumbent 
President of the Board of Trade, Michael Heseltine, who viewed escalating executive pay as 
a potential vote loser at the forthcoming general election. In his memoirs, Heseltine states 
that ‘the criticism was intense and damaging [to the government]’, adding that ‘in order to try 
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and deflect some of the criticism and particularly look for a means to avoid future outcry, I 
invited Sir Richard Greenbury to examine the issues involved’ (Heseltine, 2000, p. 468). 
Greenbury was initially reluctant to accept the role, recalling that he was ‘quite loath 
to join [the committee] in any shape or form at the time’, but was persuaded by Sir Michael 
Angus who had recently completed a three-year term as CBI President and remained a source 
of authority within the organization. Sir Richard then proceeded to appoint members on the 
basis of their seniority in what he identified as interested constituencies: the City, the 
corporate world, institutional and small shareholders, the investment community, and pension 
funds (see Table 2). The final committee consisted of 11 full members and five advisers, one 
of whom was the former Director General of the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), 
brought in to draft the committee’s recommendations and subsequently write the report. The 
selection of committee members provoked some mildly negative comments as several 
members had faced charges of receiving excessive and undeserved pay increases. For 
example, when Sir Iain Vallance, Executive Chairman of BT, received a 43% pay increase in 
1991, he was dubbed in the press as the ‘pound a minute man’ (Oulton, 1991, p. 3), although 
the controversy quickly dissipated when it emerged that his entire £250,000 bonus had been 
donated to charity (Maitland, 2008). 
The study group first convened in February 1995 and was charged with producing a 
report by the time that Parliament was prorogued in July of that year. There was thus a 
relatively short period of five months to collect evidence, debate issues and compile a report. 
Most interviewees recalled eight separate meetings of the full committee, each over breakfast 
at Marks & Spencer’s head office in Baker Street, London. The civil servant responsible for 
writing the report spent June and early July 1995 putting together the document prior to the 
dissolution of Parliament. This involved a series of one-to-one meetings with study group 
members before agreement was reached on wording and recommendations. 
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Greenbury is primarily remembered for its recommendations on the establishment of 
remuneration committees populated by NEDs and the publication of an annual remuneration 
committee report. Sections 1.14, B4 and 2.3 of the Greenbury Report (1995) specify that the 
remuneration committee:  
‘needs to submit a full report to the shareholders each year explaining the company’s 
approach to executive remuneration and providing full disclosure of all elements in 
the remuneration of individual directors… [which should] include full details of all 
elements in the remuneration package of each individual director by name… all listed 
companies… should comply with the code to the fullest extent practicable.’  
 
The provisions became a listing rule following acceptance of the report by government, 
mandating detailed publication of each executive director’s remuneration package under the 
usual enforcement mechanism of ‘comply or explain’. This made remuneration information 
for executive directors publicly available for the first time as a formal requirement of 
compliance. 
The Greenbury Report (1995, p. 7) states in its preface that its primary themes are 
‘accountability, responsibility, full disclosure, alignment of director and shareholder 
performance, and improved company performance.’ It emphasizes the theme of 
accountability at several other points. Section 1.16 states that the report is based on 
‘fundamental principles of accountability, transparency and performance’. Roberts (2009, p. 
958) notes that ‘with every failure of governance we have been prone to invest in yet further 
transparency as the assumed remedy for all failures’, an apparent cure-all for each new 
problem that emerges. In expressing the view that compliance is best monitored through 
listing rules, the report states that ‘the way forward as we see it lies not in statutory 
controls… but in action to strengthen accountability and encourage enhanced performance’ 
(s.1.13). It proposes that ‘the key to strengthen accountability lies in proper allocation of 
responsibility for determining directors’ remuneration, proper reporting to shareholders and 
transparency’ (s1.14). The Greenbury provisions are thus founded on the assumption that 
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increased disclosure strengthens the accountability of agents to shareholders. This was 
emphatically confirmed by all interviewees, for example: 
‘The big issue was the amount of disclosure. Some, myself included, thought we were 
going overboard … We eventually came to the agreement and published the report 
saying the key element of this is open and frank disclosure of every aspect of 
remuneration. Everything from cars, to pensions, bonuses, cash, LTIPs [long-term 
incentive plans] – everything has to be there, itemised … We thought this full and 
frank disclosure would put them [shareholders] in a position to stop abuse’ 
(committee member E). 
 
By making executive rewards more visible, Greenbury committee members assumed 
that shareholders would increasingly hold boards to account, and accordingly deliver better 
results for shareholders by aligning rewards with performance. It seems that committee 
members approached this issue with a degree of naivety, since it had been suspected for some 
time that investors found issues of reward relatively unimportant, provided returns were 
deemed acceptable, because top executive rewards, while large in relation to average salaries, 
are typically small in relation to value added, profits and dividends (Benston, 1982, p. 92). 
3. Executive pay, disclosure and accountability 
The ‘theory of change’ (Rogers, 2014) implicit in Greenbury is that remuneration 
committees with access to robust pay and performance data and policed by shareholders, to 
whom vital information should be disclosed, should enshrine in management contracts 
financial incentives and sanctions that reward good performance and punish poor 
performance, so improving both the performance and accountability of UK firms. The 
committee looked to practice in the United States (US), where remuneration committees and 
LTIPs had been in use for more than two decades (Westphal & Zajac, 1994). Committee 
members testified to the influence wielded by John Carney, the committee’s expert adviser 
on remuneration and director of the transatlantic remuneration consultancy, Towers Perrin, in 
what may be described as a classic case of transatlantic mimetic isomorphism (DiMaggio & 
Powell, 1983). 
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 Four key assumptions are foundational to the executive remuneration model 
propounded by Carney, accepted by Greenbury, and translated into the study group’s report 
and recommendations. First, it was assumed that remuneration packages could be designed 
effectively to link executive pay with corporate performance. Secondly, it was assumed that 
remuneration committees, in setting incentives, should function independently, free from 
management interference. Thirdly, it was assumed that disclosing details of executive 
remuneration would have a moderating effect on pay. Fourthly, it was assumed that 
disclosing information on executive remuneration would license institutional investors to 
exert more control over executive pay. In what follows we interrogate each of these 
assumptions in turn in light of relevant research. 
3.1 Executive pay and corporate performance 
Fundamental to the deliberations of the Greenbury study group was the idea that 
executive behavior can be controlled through contracts aligning the objectives of those who 
manage companies and the shareholders that own them (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Jensen & 
Murphy, 1990). This assumption underpins much of the academic and practitioner literatures 
on corporate governance (Hendry, Sanderson, Baker, & Roberts, 2006), and it is unsurprising 
that the Greenbury study group, populated by business leaders and advised by a US-based  
remuneration consultancy, subscribed to the conventional wisdom. This states that executives 
should be incentivised through an appropriate mix of basic pay, bonuses and LTIPs to pursue 
strategies and make decisions that maximize total shareholder returns (Clarke et al., 2018). 
Under this prescription, pay should be increased in line with corporate performance, 
rewarding executives by degree of success and penalizing them for failure to meet agreed 
objectives. According to agency theory, the potentially conflicting interests of principals 
(shareholders) and agents (executives) are reconciled by optimal contracting (Price et al., 
2018). 
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The existence of a positive relationship between top executive pay and corporate 
performance, however, has been called into question by research conducted post-Greenbury. 
Buck, Bruce, Main and Udueni (2003) find that LTIPs introduced after 1995 intended to 
increase pay-performance sensitivity led in practice to reduced sensitivity to total shareholder 
returns. Gregg, Jewell and Tonks (2012) find pay to performance symmetries when stock 
returns are high, but pay to be less sensitive to performance when stock returns are low. Even 
more starkly, a study by Li and Young (2016) of FTSE-350 companies finds that while total 
realized pay for the median CEO rose by 82% in real terms between 2003 and 2014/15, the 
median company generated ‘little in the way of a meaningful economic profit over the period 
2003-2009 … and although performance improved from 2010 onwards, the median firm 
generated less than 1% economic return on invested capital per year’ (p. 1). The authors 
conclude that ‘despite relentless pressure from regulators and governance reformers … to 
ensure closer alignment between executive pay and performance’, there is little evidence of a 
positive association ‘between pay outcomes and … value creation’ (p.  2). 
These studies cast doubt on the validity of Greenbury’s assumption that incentive 
payments would be triggered only when stringent performance criteria had been met. In 
practice, this ideal is often frustrated by executive manipulation of targets and information, as 
confirmed by research on CEO incentives and the manipulation of reported earnings 
(Bergstresser & Philippon, 2006), CEO contracts and misreporting (Burns & Kedia, 2006), 
and the impact of earnings management on pay-for-performance (Cornett, Marcus, & 
Tehranian, 2008). Research from a behavioral economics perspective by Pepper, Gore, and 
Crossman (2013) on financial incentives and the motivation of senior executives likewise 
concludes that ‘the way executives frame choices, perceive value, assess probability, evaluate 
temporal effects and respond to uncertainty means that LTIPs are generally not efficient and 
are often not effective in meeting their objectives’ (p. 36). Harris and Bromiley (2007) 
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meanwhile find that the adoption of high levels of executive share options increases the 
probability of corporate financial misrepresentation, and Harris (2009) goes further in 
suggesting that it is naïve to believe that increased financial incentives will lead to value 
creation rather than behaviors that simply trigger pay-outs for management. In the extreme 
case of Enron, a large proportion of total compensation came from stock options, 
incentivising executives to focus on ‘creating expectations of rapid growth and … puff up 
reported earnings (Healy & Pelepu, 2003, p. 13).  
3.2 Remuneration committees and top executive pay 
 Remuneration committees composed of independent non-executive directors were 
assumed by the Greenbury committee to have the authority to negotiate at arm’s-length with 
senior executives over performance targets and related financial rewards. It was asserted that 
remuneration committee members, if appropriately supported by expert advisers, have the 
critical distance from management needed objectively to devise and implement remuneration 
packages that might simultaneously deliver improved returns for shareholders and 
appropriately reward top executives. According to our analysis, the informational, technical 
and behavioral challenges involved in the process were never considered in detail. 
 The second Greenbury assumption – that remuneration committees are free to bargain 
with executives at arm’s-length, independently and objectively – has since been challenged in 
the literature. Bebchuk and Fried (2004), leading critics of contemporary executive pay 
arrangements, argue that chronic information asymmetries and the power wielded by 
management teams have resulted in executives, in part at least, taking over ‘the compensation 
machine, leading to arrangements that fail to provide managers with desirable incentives’ (p. 
8). Under this scenario, executives are able to ‘capture’ boards and board committees, 
including remuneration committees, to reap undeserved rewards by manipulating 
performance management systems to advantage (Shan & Walter, 2016). In effect, managers 
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‘use their power to secure rents … extracting value beyond what they would obtain under 
arm’s length bargaining’ (Bebchuk & Fried, 2004, p. 61). This is particularly true with 
respect to LTIPs, which ‘enable managers to reap windfalls from stock price increases that 
are due to market and sector forces beyond managerial control’ (p. 73).  
 According to Bebchuk and Fried (2003), the problem of ‘pay without performance’ is 
ultimately the result of shareholders, as principals, having ceded control of firms to 
executives as agents. Remuneration committees, especially those under the effective control 
of powerful CEOs are seen as inadequate to the task of designing compensation schemes that 
adequately align executive pay with corporate performance. A measure of support for this 
hypothesis is found in Sapp’s (2008) Canadian study of executive remuneration at 416 firms 
listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange showing that weak internal governance arrangements 
result in  higher pay.   However, in a US study of remuneration committee behavior over 14 
years of 110 randomly selected firms listed on the New York Stock Exchange, Anderson and 
Bizjak (2003, p. 1323) find ‘little evidence that greater committee independence affects 
executive pay’ or that removing CEOs from remuneration committees limits pay or 
incentives. Meanwhile, in testing for the impact of remuneration committee independence on 
CEO pay, using UK data for FTSE-350 firms for 1996-2008, Gregory-Smith (2012, p. 510) 
finds no evidence of a relationship between CEO pay and director independence, 
‘challenging the theory of managerial power’.  In the same vein, Ryan and Wiggins (2004) 
find that the pressure to increase the proportion of pay stemming from LTIPs has come not 
from executives but from independent directors seeking to exercise greater control over top 
management teams. This is consistent with Sun, Cahan and Emanuel’s (2009) finding that the 
higher the quality of a remuneration committee, where quality stems from the collective 
experience, seniority and network centrality of members, the better aligned are incentives to 
future performance.  
 14 
 It may be concluded that while designing incentive schemes that accurately equate 
executive pay with corporate performance is problematic, confounding the first of 
Greenbury’s assumptions, typically this is not because remuneration committees cede control 
to the executives with whom they are contracting. To this extent, Greenbury was correct in 
assuming that remuneration committees populated by independent directors might assume the 
power and authority needed to negotiate at arm’s-length with senior executives over terms 
and conditions of employment. This said, it would be naïve to believe that management is 
completely lacking in agency in the remuneration setting process, as Jensen and Murphy 
(2004, p. 50) point out: ‘remuneration committees routinely lack the information, expertise 
and negotiating skills necessary for hard-nosed contract negotiations with incumbent and 
incoming executives [and] as a result, executive contracts are almost inevitably tilted towards 
the benefit of top executives.’ 
3.3 The impact of disclosure on executive remuneration 
The third of the Greenbury assumptions – that remuneration disclosure, by placing 
shareholders in a better position to sanction executives, might have a moderating effect on 
pay – finds little support in the literature. The weak empirical relationship between executive 
pay and corporate performance suggests the existence of forces more powerful than 
shareholder pressure in determining executive rewards. Notably, in answer to the question 
‘why has CEO pay increased so much’, Gabaix and Landier (2008, p. 72), after testing a 
simple competitive model of CEO compensation predicting that compensation should change 
in proportion to the average size of firm in a group, conclude that the six-fold growth in US 
CEO pay between 1980 and 2003 was attributable to a corresponding increase in the market 
capitalization of large firms. This suggests the existence of a market for top executive talent 
governed by prevailing norms and expectations, supporting the argument made by Ezzamel 
and Watson (1998, p. 221) that ‘in an informationally efficient executive labor market, it is 
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unrealistic to expect changes in executive pay to be closely related to firm performance 
measures.’ What matters more, they hold, is that ‘for motivational, recruitment and retentions 
reasons, a firm’s compensation committee has to ensure that its senior executives are paid at 
least the going rate, or the compensation level paid by similar firms to comparable 
individuals occupying comparable posts.’ The authors find strong support for the hypothesis 
that recognition of pay anomalies by relatively underpaid executives leads to significant 
upward pay adjustments, fuelling the tendency to bid up levels of remuneration, ‘consistent 
with the argument that there is an upward bias in executive pay’ (p. 230). The same scenario 
is modelled in game theoretic terms by Hayes and Schaefer (2009, p. 289), who demonstrate 
that pay disclosure ‘may spur a Lake Wobegon Effect’, widely cited as a potential cause for 
rising CEO pay, which is seen to occur ‘because no firm wants to admit to having a CEO 
who is below average, and so no firm allows its CEO’s pay package to lag market 
expectations’ (p. 280). In other words, disclosure, in exposing cases of relative 
underpayment, combined with the inclination of remuneration committees to pay executives 
above the norm, incites the ratcheting up of executive pay. Hence the escalation in executive 
pay in Canada following the mandating of disclosure in 1993 (Craighead, Magnan, & 
Thorne, 2004). 
Remuneration consultants have been heavily implicated in the ratcheting up process. 
The argument runs that ‘since pay below the 50th percentile is often labelled “below market” 
while pay between the 50th and 75th is considered “competitive,” the surveys [undertaken by 
consultants] have contributed to a “ratchet” effect in executive pay levels as firms choose to 
target their pay above the 50th percentile’ (Jensen  & Murphy, 2004, p. 56). Moreover, it is 
suggested that because remuneration consultants are hired by senior management, not 
remuneration committees, there is ‘an obvious potential conflict of interest, since the 
consultants make recommendations on the pay of the individuals who hire them’, increasing 
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the likelihood of inflated rewards (p. 55). That some consultants engage in cross selling 
services might, it has been suggested, exacerbate this tendency. Murphy and Sandino (2010), 
for example, find evidence that in both the US and Canada CEO pay is higher when 
consultants sell multiple services to client firms. However, other researchers have found little 
evidence to support the cross-selling hypothesis (Cadman, Carter, & Hillegeist, 2010). 
Conyon, Peck, and Sadler (2009), in a comparative study of large US and UK firms, reject 
the conflict of interest hypothesis, but confirm that CEO pay is higher in firms that use 
remuneration consultants, and that LTIPs constitute a larger part of total compensation in 
consultant advised firms. 
3.4 Remuneration disclosure and shareholder engagement 
 The fourth assumption underpinning the Greenbury recommendations – that 
disclosing information on executive remuneration would license institutional investors to 
exert more control over executive pay – stemmed from the belief that intermediaries like 
pension funds and asset managers were willing and able to challenge proposals made by 
corporate boards. Research findings on this topic are mixed and deny ready interpretation. 
This is because we have little direct knowledge about when and how institutional investors 
engage with the majority of firms in which they have significant holdings, although research 
supports the view that in closely-held firms with a handful of dominant shareholders there is 
a higher degree of sensitivity of pay-to-performance (Hartzell & Starks, 2003; Craighead et 
al., 2004), suggesting that large shareholders more readily intervene to align their interests 
with those of management. However, for the majority of firms with widely-held shares, the 
connections between institutional investors and senior managers are seen to have become 
progressively weaker as a consequence of three related trends (Wong, 2010). First, 
institutional investors – hedge funds, mutual funds, pension funds and asset managers – 
typically hold shares in hundreds and even thousands of companies, which makes monitoring 
 17 
difficult and costly. Many employ proxy advisors to offer guidance and vote at annual 
general meetings rather than engaging directly with portfolio firms. Second, institutional 
investors are under pressure to maximize financial returns and routinely engage in buying and 
selling blocks of shares, with the result that average holding times in the US and UK are now 
measured in months, not years (Sikka & Stittle, 2018). Third, there has been a lengthening of 
the share ownership chain with more intermediaries coming between owners and managers, 
as for example when a pension fund delegates ‘pension fund investment management to a 
chain of external relationships involving actuaries, investment consultants, and fund 
managers’ (Tilba & McNulty, 2013, p. 165). The upshot is that the incentives for institutional 
investors to serve as stewards within the corporate governance system have diminished, 
leaving managers, according to Bebchuk and Fried (2004), in a more commanding position. 
 These themes are explored in a landmark survey of 143 US institutional investors by 
McCahery, Sautner, and Starks (2016), revealing that 63% of respondents had engaged 
directly with portfolio firms in the previous five years, and that 45% had met board members 
without executives present. These results are consistent with prior evidence that individual 
institutions frequently engage with management behind the scenes (Dimson, Karakas, & Li, 
2015). Voting against management resolutions was used by 53% of respondents as a regular 
means of engagement. More extreme engagement channels were found to have relatively 
high usage rates, with ‘15% of respondents having taken legal actions and 13% having 
publicly criticized their portfolio companies’ (p. 2913). Long-term investors were found to 
intervene far more often than short-term investors on matters such as executive pay, strategy 
and corporate governance, and 60% of respondents used the services of proxy advisors for 
information on portfolio companies and voting on resolutions. The authors conclude that 
while there is extensive evidence of institutional investor engagement, there are numerous 
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impediments limiting engagement such as monitoring costs, high portfolio turnover rates, and 
legal concerns that serve as barriers to shareholder activism (pp.  2921-2923). 
 These findings are consistent with those of UK research. Dong and Ozkan (2008) use 
portfolio turnover rates to distinguish between engaged and disengaged institutional investors 
in their study of executive remuneration setting at 546 non-financial firms. They find that the 
presence of engaged institutional investors restrains pay and increases pay-performance 
sensitivity, whereas disengaged institutional investors have no discernible impact on either. 
Tilba and McNulty’s (2013) qualitative study of UK pension funds finds that only a handful 
of well-resourced and internally managed funds exhibit engaged ownership traits. Conyon 
and Sadler find that between 2002 and 2007 just 10% of shareholders abstained or voted 
against the mandated Directors Remuneration Report resolutions and that the trend is 
downward. These and similar results, suggest McNulty and Nordberg (2016), highlight the 
tension resulting from the clash of market forces that cause institutional investor 
disengagement and the political and institutional forces that urge engagement. 
3.5 Summation and stance 
Research on executive remuneration and pay disclosure exposes the flaws in the 
theory of change animating the Greenbury study group recommendations. It is not the case 
that remuneration committees, however independent of management, have found it easy to 
increase the sensitivity of pay to performance. Nor have institutional investors armed with 
information on pay stepped in regularly to monitor performance and challenge the 
recommendations of incumbent boards. Disclosing the details of remuneration packages has 
not moderated the escalation in executive pay and income inequality. In sum, disclosure, the 
activities of pay consultants, normative pressures, the passivity of shareholders and 
competition between firms to pay executives at above the going rate have conspired 
systematically to incite the ratcheting up of executive pay, fueling disparities in income and 
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wealth (Clarke et al., 2018). 
The stance we adopt here is that powerful market forces, already unleashed at the time 
of Greenbury, have transformed the position of most institutional investors, with notable 
exceptions such as CalPERS and Hermes that actively manage their own money, making 
them less willing to play a stewardship role in matters of corporate governance. There is 
pressure for institutional investors to act as responsible owners, but for the most part they do 
not (Sikka & Stittle, 2018). Accountability is conflicted because institutional investors 
increasingly act as self-interested agents rather than owners. It is thus not so much that 
executives have become powerful versus investors, as Bebchuk and Fried (2004) contend, but 
that the institutional investors are incentivized to act as self-interested agents, increasing 
portfolio turnover to improve fund performance. Short termism in effect produces disengaged 
investors, undermining the agency theory assumption of robust negotiations between owners 
and managers. Greenbury, in buying into this assumption, in framing the problem of 
executive pay as one of pay-for-performance rather than the absolute level of pay, applied 
agency thinking to justify and perpetuate high and rising pay. The main effect of disclosure 
was then to feed the ratcheting up of incentives rather than help foster a culture of fairness 
and restraint, as Kay (2017) has recently observed. In what follows, we explore through a 
micro-historical study of the discourse, recommendations and reflections of Greenbury 
committee members and advisers, the social, political and institutional underpinnings of 
inflated levels of executive remuneration in countries like the UK. We are concerned, more 
specifically, to understand why so much faith has been placed in disclosure as a means of 
justifying and controlling executive remuneration, what has gone wrong, and what might be 
done to help remedy the situation. 
4. Methodology 
Our broad methodological stance is that of historical organization studies: 
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organizational research that draws extensively on historical data, methods and knowledge to 
generate analyses ‘whose validity derives from both historical veracity and conceptual rigor’ 
to enrich ‘understanding of historical, contemporary and future-directed social realities’ 
(Maclean, Harvey, & Clegg, 2016, p. 609). We were attracted to the Greenbury committee as 
a site of elite deliberations, within what Bourdieu (1996) calls the ‘field of power’, about a 
matter of societal relevance, the legitimacy of escalating executive rewards. The importance 
of such deliberations is that they constitute formative, future-facing responses to a perceived 
threat to the ‘right to rule’ enjoyed by allied economic and political elites (Price et al., 2018). 
Greenbury, in championing the twin notions of the remuneration committee as an 
independent mechanism for executive pay determination and disclosure as a potential source 
of shareholder control, offered a few apparently important reforms that did not however 
disrupt the elite’s dominating role in corporate governance structures (Nordberg & McNulty, 
2013). In conducting in-depth research on a single event in the past which has received 
relatively little direct attention, we followed a micro-historical approach, examining a general 
phenomenon through the lens of a singular occurrence (Davis, 1983; Ginzburg, 2013). The 
analytical processes in which we engaged during our research, together with their associated 
purposes and outcomes are outlined in Table 1. These relate to processes of sequencing, 
whereby we established the chronology and relative significance of events; contextualizing, 
whereby we attempted to locate events in their situated contexts; exploring, whereby we 
actively sought to make causal links between actors, events and their ensuing outcomes; and 
interpreting, whereby we sought to reveal wider meaning from interrogating this specific 
case. 
[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
Fundamental to historical organization studies is the gathering of primary data from 
documents and oral histories that might cast fresh light on the power-laden procedural and 
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discursive processes fundamental to institutional change (Maclean et al., 2016). 
Unfortunately, there is little documentary evidence relating to the proceedings of the 
Greenbury committee and in (re)constructing the inside-story – sequencing, contextualizing, 
exploring and interpreting (see Table 1) – we had to rely near completely on the testimony of 
oral-history interviews with committee members and professional advisers, 10 in total (see 
Table 2). In addition, one committee member provided written answers to our questions, and 
we conducted four supplementary interviews with governance experts, two chairmen of 
leading UK FTSE listed companies, and two senior fund managers who provided an 
institutional investor perspective on UK corporate governance post-Greenbury. We were 
fortunate to collect data from all the living members of the committee, the sole exception 
being Sir Denys Henderson who was too ill to participate.   
[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
Corporate governance settings constitute, as Gendron (2018, p. 1) affirms, ‘privileged 
sites’ in which to examine power effects together with processes of marginalization. In 
conducting elite interviews, the relative status of the interviewee is an important 
methodological consideration that has received increasing attention in the methods literature 
(Buchanan & Bryman, 2009; Denzin & Lincoln, 2005; Empson, 2018). Interviewing elites 
presents many opportunities for potentially rich and detailed findings given their structural 
proximity to government and their wide societal influence (Dexter, 2006). However, it also 
raises challenges, including those of access and reliability. The existence of barriers to keep 
critics at bay is partly what defines a community as ‘elite’ in the first place. To overcome this 
problem, the authors capitalized on their status as neutral university researchers to gain 
access (Rice, 2010). 
As experienced communicators, the interviewees had the skill, when sensing danger, 
to close off or truncate potentially critical lines of enquiry. Such behavior, however, was not 
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typical. Most interviewees felt the passage of time had given them license to speak openly 
about their recollections of context, events, personalities, group dynamics, issues debated and 
recommendations emerging. This enabled us to triangulate the statements made in different 
interviews to put together a historically trustworthy narrative, one of the conditions of the 
dual integrity – faithfulness to historical sources allied to conceptual rigor – that characterises 
historical organization studies (Maclean et al., 2016, p. 616). 
 Our semi-structured interviews followed a standard pattern. The first set of questions 
concerned the circumstances surrounding formation of the committee and the recruitment of 
members and advisers. A second set of questions concerned committee processes, origin of 
ideas, evidence, opinions, influences, debates, disagreements and the crafting of the report 
and recommendations. A more challenging third set of questions concerned the personal role 
played by the interviewee, the consequences of Greenbury, and reflections on participation in 
a historically significant event. In effect, the third set of questions, which began by asking 
interviewees to reflect on a graph showing the escalation in CEO pay post-Greenbury (see 
Figure 1), was calling them to account, to voluntarily disclose their thoughts and feelings on 
sensitive matters (Lowenthal, 2015, pp. 72-79). This, as we intended, enabled the creation of 
a richer, more nuanced dataset (Tanggaard, 2007, p. 172). This said, it is important to bear in 
mind that all oral-history testimonies are more or less tainted by retrospective sensemaking 
and therefore cannot fully capture the empirical specificity of the past. Viewed in this light, 
there is a danger that the accounts rendered by interviewees may represent a form of 
rhetorical history (Suddaby, Foster, & Quinn Trank, 2010), using the past instrumentally to 
help manage the future (Shrives & Brennan, 2017). This being said, our general impression is 
that each of the interviewees gave what they believed to be a true account of the workings 
and deliberations of the study group and the role they played in it. 
[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
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 The interviews typically lasted an hour and a half, although that with Sir Richard 
Greenbury lasted over three hours. All interviews were recorded and transcribed producing a 
data set of over 100,000 words that was axially coded (using NVIVO as a research tool) to 
reduce the number of germane categories of discourse to a manageable number (Strauss & 
Corbin, 1998). Broadly, answers to our first set of questions were used to explore the 
historical context in which Greenbury was established and reported. Answers to the second 
set of questions were used critically to analyse the discourse of the interviewees and unearth 
the logic of making disclosure central to the Greenbury recommendations (Fairclough, 2003; 
Weiss & Wodak, 2007). In this we follow the analytical method pioneered by Gioia (Gioia, 
Corley, & Hamilton, 2012), which focuses on the processes through which organizational 
outcomes unfold (section 5 below). Answers to the third set of questions were used to analyse 
the retrospective sensemaking of Greenbury committee members and professional advisers 
(Maclean, Harvey, & Chia, 2012; Malsch, Tremblay, & Gendron, 2012) (sections 6 and 7 
below). 
5. Discursive construction of disclosure as an institutional fix 
Control of discourse is of central importance in the process of change (Golant, 
Sillince, Harvey, & Maclean, 2015; Suddaby & Greenwood, 2005). In our research, the focus 
is on how the Greenbury committee through discourse conceived its solution to the prevailing 
crisis of authority in UK corporate governance. The logic at work is displayed in Table 3, in 
which seven regularly deployed discursive devices (second-order themes) – namely 
scapegoating, partial acceptance of criticism, negating alternatives, normalizing assumptions, 
appealing to principle, affirming traditions, and stating credentials – are mapped to three 
discursive strategies (aggregate themes): deflecting criticism, mobilizing support, and 
establishing legitimacy. Each second-order theme is illustrated by a text segment typical of 
the remarks made by interviewees. 
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[TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
 It is important to remember when reading the illustrative quotations reproduced in 
Table 3 that our interviewees were elite corporate actors with a strong vested interest in 
restoring moral authority to the UK system of corporate governance. Members were 
ideologically bonded and understood their role as defenders of the system, a system perceived 
to require improvement but not radical change. This stance was affirmed by one professional 
adviser appointed ‘to work closely with Rick [Greenbury, as chairman] to ensure he stuck to 
the party line’ (professional adviser A), which was to concede that pay had ‘gone up and 
[was] increasingly disproportionately’ (committee member A), but that the problem was not 
endemic and might be solved by taking the ‘opportunity … to self-regulate’ (committee 
member E). Thus, by condemning the ‘excessive’ pay awards recently granted to CEOs of 
privatized utilities, Greenbury found a convenient scapegoat on which to deflect criticism 
(Greenbury, 1995, s.8, pp. 49-52). As one committee member recollected: 
‘[Greenbury] was to get the government out of a political mess, the utilities had been 
privatized and the pay was getting ramped up. British Gas! Government didn’t want to 
regulate, government said, “do self-regulation”, put everything together, put them in a 
room and wait and see what comes out’ (committee member C). 
 
The same member readily accepted that executive contracts had become outdated, failing to 
link pay with performance, with long notice periods written into CEO contracts that resulted 
in high termination costs. In this way, criticism was deflected away from high pay per se 
toward the need to justify high pay with commensurate performance. His declared objective 
was to ‘make the pay of these agents of shareholders have some sort of basis in reality, as a 
reward for doing the job’ (committee member C). 
 Deflecting criticism was a prelude to mobilizing support for alternative solutions to 
the adverse consequences of escalating executive pay. An essential step in the discursive 
process was to negate alternatives like government legislation to limit executive pay. On this 
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matter, members of the committee were entirely united, understanding their role as heading 
off any move toward heavy-handed state interference. As one member recalled: 
‘I was aware that if Greenbury had not come out with his code that threat of political 
intervention was very substantial. There’s no doubt that there would have been political 
action. No one actually waved a red flag and said “if you don’t do this”, but I think 
there was an awareness that if Greenbury did not come up with some sensible 
recommendations then something else would get there first’ (committee member, F). 
 
What is interesting here is that study group members, as like-minded members of the 
business elite, understood what was required of them without explicit discussion of the threat 
facing the existing governance regime.  
The key issues confronting the committee therefore were (1) how to contrive, and (2) 
sell a solution to the executive pay crisis within the existing framework of self-regulation. 
The idea of disclosing top executive remuneration as an instrument of accountability may 
have been novel in the UK context, but it was familiar to several committee members through 
experience of US practice. The combination of LTIPs, remuneration committees, pay 
consultants and disclosure was in effect a readymade solution, and it had a champion in John 
Carney, Managing Director of remuneration consultants Towers Perrin, professional adviser 
to the committee. As professional adviser C confirmed, ‘American pay models were 
attractive, there was a feeling the US was very successful and should be emulated.’ 
Mobilizing support within and beyond the committee was achieved through the 
deployment of three discursive devices (Mueller & Whittle, 2011). Having negated 
alternatives involving state intervention, disclosure of information and transparency in pay-
setting processes emerged as a linchpin of the proposed reforms. Professional Adviser C 
recalls the mood at a study group breakfast meeting when the key decision was taken to 
recommend ‘frank and full disclosure’ as the key recommendation: 
‘It was like the tide of history, it was such like, you know, this had to happen because 
we were seeing too many abuses. We thought we needed to have the oxygen and the 
light and that this is the only way we could set it up … I had a colleague here draft up 
the form for disclosure which was adopted by the committee’ (professional adviser C). 
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Recommending disclosure, being more transparent about pay, served the vital discursive 
function of appealing to principles of openness, fairness and best practice, lending a singular 
rhetorical advantage to the proponents of self-regulation.  
Beyond disclosure, in normalizing assumptions about shareholder primacy and the 
critical role of CEOs in determining corporate performance, the study group confirmed its 
commitment to the idea that potentially conflicting interests of agents and principals might be 
reconciled through optimal contracting. Under this rationale, the problem of high pay 
evaporates when executive pay is sensitive to corporate performance, again appealing to 
principle. Hence Greenbury’s championing of LTIPs and performance sensitive executive 
pay. As one member of the committee recalled:  
‘[My] agenda was to get companies to think about they wanted to do. To tell 
shareholders this is what we think you want us to do, tell us if it’s not, these are our 
operating objectives, we will now encapsulate them with the help of the remuneration 
consultants in a proper set of objectives and remuneration targets linked to the 
objectives – that was number one in my list’ (committee member C). 
 
Thus, by appealing to the principle that remuneration committees would only sanction 
exceptional rewards for exceptional performance, Greenbury sought to dissipate the 
prevailing mood that personal greed had triumphed over public good, in the process 
mobilizing support for the study group’s recommendations. 
That this argument was made by a group of senior business leaders responsible for 
Britain’s largest firms and led by Sir Richard Greenbury, was fundamental in establishing 
legitimacy (Suddaby & Greenwood, 2005). Even the most cynical of media critics and anti-
corporate politicians tend to find it difficult to resist pragmatic arguments for continuity, 
especially when they are advanced by reputable members of the dominant elite (Maclean, 
Harvey, & Chia, 2010). Stating credentials was thus important in creating an aura of 
expertise and control around the committee’s work. In addition to the inclusion of key 
stakeholders such as the UK’s National Association of Pension Funds (NAPF) and the 
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Association of British Insurers (ABI), the selection of Greenbury to lead the committee was 
critical, in that he personified stability and honesty. Greenbury was a man who had 
demonstrated he was in business for the long term; having served his entire career at Marks 
& Spencer, starting as an apprentice in 1952, before working his way up to become the first 
non-family CEO of the company, which constituted one of the UK’s most cherished brands. 
As Mowbray (1995, p. 3) puts it, ‘[Marks & Spencer’s is] the high-street incarnation of our 
values and aspirations… synonymous with service, organisation and trustworthiness’.  
To maintain the ‘party line’ that self-regulation was better than legal intervention 
meant the committee’s recommendations had to be accepted by stakeholders as authoritative. 
Capture and control of the discursive process was essential to maintaining the status quo 
(Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, p. 63). Affirming traditions, invoking strong feelings of 
identification, can serve as a herald to the new whilst resisting wholesale change (Golant et 
al., 2015). This is the device at work here: 
‘Our system over a couple of centuries has been self-regulatory in the broadest sense 
of the word to avoid having to put things into law because they’re immediately out of 
date and smart people will get around them ... self-regulation is always the most 
efficient regulation’ (committee member F). 
 
The model presented in Figure 2, derived inductively on the basis of the analysis 
presented here, proposes that the three rhetorical strategies in play within Greenbury, when 
combined, formed a persuasive rationale for the establishment of remuneration committees 
composed of independent directors, more extensive use of LTIPs, and disclosure of top 
executive rewards. The origins of the committee lay in the crisis of moral authority manifest 
in public anger following revelations that ‘the snouts of British bosses were too deeply or too 
blatantly in the trough’ (Basset, 1995, p. 34), which stirred the ruling elite into action in the 
form of Greenbury. Anointed by the CBI, the committee effectively claimed it had the right 
people to proffer a sound solution to the nagging problem of top executive pay, making an 
already sound system even more robust. Its arguments proved persuasive and its 
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recommendations were accepted, thereby ostensibly restoring moral authority to leading 
actors within the UK governance regime. 
[FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
6. Retrospective sensemaking of knowledgeable agents 
Our interviews with members of the Greenbury committee and its professional 
advisers included, as mentioned, the presentation of a graph showing a substantial increase in 
mean executive pay following the adoption of the Greenbury code. Although the sharply 
upward trajectory of the graph came as a surprise to some, all were aware of the general trend 
in executive remuneration since the committee reported in 1995. The escalation in executive 
pay, of course, had been widely reported in the media (Thompson, 2005), with the High Pay 
Centre computing in 2013 that ‘the ratio of CEO pay to the average worker has risen from 
47:1 in 1998 to 133:1 in 2012’ (High Pay Centre, 2013). 
Each interviewee was invited to discuss this change in rewards in the light of the 
Greenbury provisions. Committee member H spoke for the majority, opining that ‘the 
executives are constantly taking more and the shareholders are getting less’, a view endorsed 
by committee member F, who concluded that executive pay ‘is operating against the 
shareholder now.’ On observing the graph, committee member B conceded that the 
Greenbury code ‘had the opposite effect to that which we intended. No question’. Committee 
member C agreed, stating that it was:  
‘Appalling. It clearly wasn’t the idea of the committee. These were unintended 
consequences. Nobody can dispute that pay has gone up increasingly and 
disproportionately... nobody thought of what the consequences would be in terms of 
[the trend revealed by the graph].’ 
 
Committee member D’s belief was that ‘it certainly didn’t have the moderating effect [on 
executive pay] many might have hoped for.’ Committee member A commented that: 
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‘It’s a clear criticism of transparency, and it was something I was worried about. My 
recollection was that it was raised by David Simon [CEO of BP], I think, who was 
worried about everyone seeing each other’s pay’ (committee member A).  
 
When committee member A asked the chair of one remuneration committee why the CEO 
had been awarded a large pay increase, he was told that ‘the simple answer is [that because of 
disclosure] he knows what people in the US are earning and all the other companies, and he 
doesn’t want to earn less than they do’. Committee member G observed that when 
remuneration reports were read by other top executives, ‘nobody says, “Oh, I’m paid more 
than him”… everybody says, “I’m paid less than him and I’m worth more.”’ 
The discussions that took place at meetings of the committee about the role of 
remuneration committees were focused on the necessity for shareholders and other 
stakeholders to see that they functioned in a fair and principled manner to control executive 
pay. Committee members felt with hindsight that remuneration committees had done good 
work and had good intentions, but conceded that the goal of moderating executive pay had 
not been achieved: ‘it looks like a system which has the greatest of integrity but the way it 
actually operates is different’ (Professional Advisor C). In another telling example, 
committee member B elaborated on a recent conversation prior to a meeting of the 
remuneration committee of a large FTSE-100 organisation which routinely paid 10% above 
the median level:    
‘[The chief executive would say] “you know we’re special”, “we’ve got a more 
ambitious programme than everybody else”. It’s extraordinary how people can 
persuade themselves they should have more than everybody else’ (committee member 
B). 
 
Members also thought it likely that remuneration consultants, through the production 
of comparative statistics and sophisticated LTIPs, had played a role in escalating rewards 
throughout the period, as committee member E elaborated: 
‘Unfortunately, one of the unintended consequences is that they [the remuneration 
consultants] are holding the pen in the writing of remuneration reports because 
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everybody is so scared of these policy documents, that they are defaulting to the 
consultants writing large chunks of them’ (committee member E). 
 
Although the practice of employing remuneration consultants was relatively common in 
the UK prior to 1995, Greenbury normalized the use of outside consultants (s.4), which, in 
hindsight, may have contributed to pay escalation, as professional advisor A acknowledges: 
‘You always pitch yourself in the highest quartile. The paradox here is that this sort of 
visibility is actually driving an escalator in pay, which is poor value for shareholders’. 
Chairman A, an incumbent chair of a major FTSE 100 organisation, corroborates this point: 
‘If you really analyse it [remuneration packages] and value it in immense depth, and 
lots of remuneration committees haven’t got the time or the energy to do that, you are 
being misled. I think the Towers Perrins and the New Bridge Streets [remuneration 
consultants] are a seriously pernicious influence on this market’ (chairman A). 
 
Committee members accepted that disclosure had generated an unexpected and 
unwelcome ratcheting up effect; one of the unintended consequences of regulation that 
Murphy and Jensen (2018, p. 2) argue ‘have substantially damaged the efficacy of CEO pay 
practices in the US.’ The non-executive chairman of a major British FTSE listed company, 
interviewed for our research, though not a member of the Greenbury committee, claimed that 
‘this pernicious system has driven completely new behavior which is not helpful, and it’s 
helped to crack the trust between the shareholders and the executives’ (chairman A). Yet it is 
generally agreed that institutional investors are in the main disengaged owners and that some 
do not perceive a problem with executive pay, since they themselves earn still larger sums 
(Tilba & McNulty, 2013). Committee member G agreed: ‘the remuneration of fund managers 
has increased more steeply than the directors you’re looking at. That does impact, as they 
don’t see it as being abnormal’. All these factors had conspired, concluded one committee 
member, to fuel the ratcheting up of executive pay: 
‘The substantive unintended consequence of Greenbury was that the requirement for 
transparency in executive directors’ remuneration, coupled with the proliferation of 
consultants in the area, together with the virtual impossibility for any remuneration 
committee to adopt a policy skewed towards the bottom rather than the top “quartile”, 
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has led to an inevitable onward-and-upwards momentum. Add to that the fact that the 
senior executive cadre of institutional shareholders, who are meant to be the guardians 
of propriety in remuneration matters, are largely parti pris, and there you have it’ 
(committee member, H). 
 
With regard to the revolving composition of share registers and the associated 
lengthening of investment chains since the publication of the Greenbury report, professional 
advisor C commented on the differences between shareholders now and in 1995: 
‘Of course, Greenbury was quite a charming document in some ways because … There 
is this theme behind it which is, ‘we’re the long term, the shareholders are widows and 
orphans who have inherited their shares and will keep them for a lifetime’, it’s quite 
charming and aphoristic in a way’ (Professional Advisor C). 
 
Indeed, the structural evolution of agency relationships was the impetus for the review 
conducted by Kay (2012, p. 30), who argued that ‘the imperatives of the business model of 
the agent, do not necessarily coincide with the interests of the ultimate principals’. The 
growing opacity of ownership causes the relationship between principal and agent to weaken, 
contributing to the perceived dilution of accountability. Rather than the ‘ongoing requirement 
of stewardship’, Kay observes (2017), the skills of UK fund managers ‘are largely those of 
attempting to outguess each other in the anticipation of short-term market movements.’ 
More shareholder engagement is often perceived as ‘an end in and of itself’ (Sheehan, 
2012, p. 8), yet as committee member G emphasized, ‘the mythical image of the engaged 
shareholder is a useful one to have, but in truth it just doesn’t apply. We still have this 
Victorian notion of the chap in his mansion overseeing the mills that he and his father built’. 
Committee member H agreed, adding that:  
‘You think that disclosing information about remuneration would have shamed people 
into not being too greedy… but all it does is actually encourage people to want more. 
I remember the case in the 1990s of two non-executive chairmen. One of them was 
paid about £20,000 and he saw a direct competitor who was paid £250,000… he just 
didn’t believe it. He said, “He’s useless, I should have that [same amount of money].” 
So, there is this unintended consequence, but I think there was a belief that by 
exposing things people would behave more correctly, and, actually, it seems to have 
had the reverse effect’ (committee member H).  
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Likewise, committee member G concluded that ‘if you look back over history and you look 
at the figures, what has [the Greenbury] regulation done? Board remuneration has increased’. 
Committee member D concurred, pointing out that ‘the general hope that this would lead to 
moderation and that [disclosure] would have a restraining effect has proven ill-founded’. 
Another concluded that the committee had been a failure:  
‘One of the great disappointments I have is that I think the committee failed. The 
average top twenty chief exec now earns four and a half million [pounds] a year, and I 
know several that are earning two or three million a year and are running businesses 
that make considerably less money [profit] than they did twenty years ago. It’s 
nonsense. So, we didn’t achieve anything’ (committee member E). 
 
An important conclusion emerging from these retrospective accounts is that the report’s 
recommendations, especially those pertaining to the mechanism of disclosure, served to 
promote an ‘illusion of control’ over levels of remuneration, reinforcing a myth of 
controllability in corporate governance (Tremblay, 2012). Clearly, committee members 
genuinely believed that their recommendations would in time be effective in moderating 
remuneration levels. It therefore came as a surprise to all members that unintended 
consequences, human failings and unforeseen financial market developments had conspired 
instead to produce an outcome so at variance with the committee’s intent. 
7. Accountability and executive remuneration 
Phronetic social science, Flyvbjerg (2001, p. 156) suggests, provides an antidote to 
the ‘so what’ response to research by feeding back to stakeholders contextually sensitive 
findings, enabling judgement to be ‘cultivated and communicated via the exposition of cases’ 
(pp. 135-136). How, then, might the results of our micro-historical case study contribute to 
the on-going debate on executive remuneration? The answer, we believe, following Dillard 
and Vinnari (2017) and Gendron (2018), is to recognize that our duty as critical researchers is 
not simply to specify problems but also to intervene by proposing solutions. Greenbury, it is 
now evident, as an exercise in increased accountability, failed to achieve its primary objective 
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of restoring order and a sense of fairness in the executive pay-setting process. Rather, 
disclosure has contributed to the continued escalation in executive rewards. Hence we 
propose four general conditions that should apply if the accountability relationship between 
companies (supply side) and stakeholders (demand side) is to be strengthened and rendered 
more effective.   
 The first condition is that the demand side must be motivated to hold the supply side 
to account. Roberts and Scapens (1985, p.  447) argue for ‘the giving and demanding of 
reasons for conduct’, while Gray, Owen and Adams (1996, p. 38) see accountability as ‘the 
duty to provide an account… or reckoning of those actions for which one is held 
responsible.’ Prior research on institutional investors and the changed finance sector 
landscape, however, suggest that it is misplaced simply to assume that the demand side is 
motivated to make demands on the supply side (Wong, 2010; McEnery et al., 2011; McNulty 
& Nordberg, 2016). Evidence from our research provides insights into why this condition has 
not been met in the case of executive remuneration. Committee member F observes that ‘on 
far too many occasions shareholders abstain’ from voting on remuneration matters. 
Committee member E agreed that shareholders were remiss in this regard: ‘as long as they’re 
making money, the shareholders, in my opinion, do not exercise their proper authority in this 
matter’. Professional adviser A considered this a significant issue:  
‘There is a big issue which should be directed at the major institutions, because there 
is no doubt that pay today is extremely high for people sitting in the boardroom, and 
the issue is, the disclosures are there for the shareholders to say: “up with this we will 
not put”. But they don’t… It requires quite a lot of organization to make a meaningful 
impression on the negative vote ... shareholders have tolerated some quite extreme 
cases of [remuneration] abuse’ (professional adviser A). 
 
Committee member D remarked that ‘shareholders weren’t very good at playing their 
part’ in the accountability relationship because top executive pay ‘doesn’t have that much 
effect on the profits or the dividends of investors, so they don’t put a lot of effort into it’. 
Committee member G agreed that the quiescence of shareholders was problematic: ‘If a 
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shareholder thinks that it’s the wrong thing to do and doesn’t stand up and say so, then the 
whole system falls by the wayside’. Similarly, professional adviser B concluded that ‘the vast 
majority [of shareholders] don’t give a damn nor do the hedge funds give a damn about this 
sort of stuff’. Committee member F was more circumspect in remarking that some 
shareholders do ‘give a damn, but they don’t give enough of a damn’. 
Committee member B felt that it was a case of ‘people in glass houses shouldn’t 
throw stones’ because fund managers, when confronted with evidence of excessive executive 
rewards, lacked the moral authority to intervene as they are often ‘paid just as much as those 
on whom they sit in judgement’. Another reason for a lack of interest on the part of 
shareholders, Committee member B proposed, was the sheer volume of information 
contained in annual reports. He felt that ‘too much regulation results in too much disclosure 
and can lead to loss of interest on the part of all but the most assiduous of shareholders’. It 
seems that the foundations of the accountability relationship are much weaker than assumed 
by Greenbury. Disclosure may be a necessary condition for more effective accountability, but 
it is not sufficient; it is a complement not a substitute for real engagement by owners with the 
processes and obligations of corporate governance. 
The second condition for more effective accountability is that the demand side has the 
right information needed to hold the supply side to account. Much of the debate on 
accountability is founded on the belief that provision of more information axiomatically will 
lead to increased accountability. Gray, Bebbington, and Collison (2006, p. 336), for example, 
state that ‘accountability can be considered discharged if the information can be obtained 
through an existing channel’. Gray (1991, p. 415) proposes that the ‘development of 
accountability also increases the transparency of organisations’. Broadbent, Dietrich and 
Laughlin (1996, p. 276) suggest that accountability will be enhanced by ‘allowing access to 
the debate by all stakeholders ... to present their views and to challenge the views of others’. 
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As we have seen, however, the assumption that lack of relevant information limits 
accountability and, ipso facto, that more information must facilitate increased accountability 
is open to challenge, theoretically and empirically. Indeed, Murphy and Jensen (2018, p. 34), 
on the basis of US experience, suggest that important but often ignored costs of disclosure 
must be weighed against the benefits (better monitoring of directors) in determining the 
optimal amount of pay disclosure for top managers. 
The research of Harris and Bromiley (2007), inter alia, suggests that more 
information does not always increase accountability because ‘information’ can be used to 
mislead as well as illuminate. The implication is that more attention needs to be paid to the 
specification of what is disclosed and how this information enables performance to be 
accurately evaluated. In the words of committee member C:  
‘How many companies straightforwardly say to shareholders: “This is what we are 
trying to achieve and what, as a board, we expect to be measured on, so that at the 
AGM you can then hold us accountable”. How many? Very, very few. So much gets 
lost in the fog of carefully selected words and numbers’ (committee member C). 
 
This point is brought home forcibly by the economist John Kay (2017) in his written 
evidence to the UK Parliament’s Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy Select 
Committee’s review of corporate. In this he argues that ‘the attempt to impose a standard 
reporting template across the whole corporate sector has led in practice to very lengthy 
reports, much of which is boiler-plate, and which conceal rather than highlight relevant 
information.’ He recommends that ‘corporate reporting should increasingly be … a matter of 
negotiation between investors and companies, with an eye on key performance indicators, 
rather than the subject of one-size-fits-all regulatory prescription.’ Leong and Hazelton 
(2019) likewise argue that ‘making disclosure mandatory in and of itself will not help drive 
desired social changes’, which ‘will only be driven if users … receive information relevant to 
their goals and are able to translate it into political action.’ 
Our third condition is that there must be shared understanding against which demand 
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side actors collectively agree to hold to account. Our research suggests that we are far 
removed from meeting this condition. A senior fund manager, not a member of Greenbury, 
admitted at interview that ‘there is no collective punishment’ for failure and a coordinated 
response is unlikely ‘unless maybe you have three profit warnings in three years or if the 
chairman gets arrested for corruption’ (Fund Manager A). Another fund manager emphasized 
the primacy of financial results over concerns about executive rewards, asking: ‘Would I sell 
Sainsbury’s stock just because I thought the CEO was being paid too much? No’ (Fund 
Manager B). The conclusion we draw is that many institutional investors tolerate high levels 
of pay even when not fully justified by performance provided that returns remain at an 
acceptable level, diminishing the possibility of a collective response to perceived excesses. In 
explaining the inability of shareholders to act collectively, one company chairman observed 
that since Greenbury ‘shareholders have become more diverse’ with a much lower 
concentration of ownership among pension funds (chairman B). This is confirmed by the UK 
Office for National Statistics (2012), which reports that in 1998 pension funds owned 21.7% 
of UK shares but that by 2010 this had declined to just 4.7%. Committee member D insisted 
that ‘it’s quite a lot of work for a pension fund to study [executive remuneration in detail] … 
and then decide whether or not to campaign against the remuneration of this firm or that 
firm’, essentially suggesting that high monitoring and intervention costs are partly 
responsible for the reduced ability collectively to hold to account. 
The fourth condition for increased accountability is that the demand side must have 
the power to punish underperformance against metrics and standards agreed in advance with 
the supply side. According to Day and Klein (1987, p. 5), an accountability relationship 
‘presupposes agreement about what constitutes an acceptable performance [including] the 
language of justification’. This suggests that at the individual level, in a high rewards 
environment, failure to achieve agreed goals and targets should lead to bonuses foregone, 
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stock options rescinded or loss of office. In practice, such sanctions are reluctantly invoked. 
Shareholders on occasion vote against remuneration proposals, but in such cases the typical 
response is for remuneration committee simply to return with revised packages more in line 
with shareholder expectations (Conyon & Sadler, 2010). Even more rarely have shareholders 
shown much willingness to sell large tranches of stock to signal disapproval, which is 
problematic for index investors since they must hold everything in the index. Committee 
member E discussed potential use of sanctions in terms of ‘pulling the plug’, by which he 
meant shareholders using their voting rights to outlaw or challenge high pay awards. As he 
expressed it:  
‘We’re in the mess we’re in now because the shareholders haven’t pulled the plug. 
They should have pulled the plug way back in the ’90s. From 1995 onwards, they 
could have done so, but they chose not to. If we’re really blunt about it, if you look at 
what the bankers were earning, why didn’t they pull the plug?’(committee member 
E).  
 
We can surmise that this is because shareholders lack the motivation and capacity for 
collective action needed to call the supply side to account. 
Measured against the ideal suggested by the four conditions we propose as necessary 
for increased accountability, the dynamic post-Greenbury is one of a progressively widening 
disparity between ideal and actuality. Cooper and Owen (2007, p. 653) argue that ‘if 
accountability is to be achieved, stakeholders need to be empowered such that they can hold 
the accountors to account’. How, we ask, might this be accomplished when institutional 
investors exhibit so little interest in playing their part in calling agents to account? 
8. Discussion and conclusion 
We have shown that in the case of executive remuneration, the idea that disclosure 
alone is an effective instrument of corporate governance is flawed. Disclosure, in our view, is 
a necessary but not sufficient condition for effective accountability. Everett, Neu and 
Rahaman (2007, p. 524) correctly discern that the term accountability is used in a loose 
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fashion in the literature, and that the assumed relationship between increased disclosure and 
enhanced accountability fails to live up to its promises. In some situations, as in the case of 
executive rewards, there appears to be a deficit of effective accountability in which 
shareholders fail to hold boards to account for their rewards, which, in many cases, are 
weakly associated with performance or value to shareholders. Gendron (2018, p. 1) has 
enquired in the pages of this journal, ‘corporate governance for whom; and corporate 
governance for what?’ The answer suggested by this research is that the remuneration 
provisions introduced by Greenbury have served executives well by sanctioning ever higher 
levels of compensation, to the detriment of other constituencies, including shareholders, 
government, and the general public (Clarke et al., 2018). In short, corporate governance in 
the case of Greenbury has benefitted executive agents while neglecting the interests of a 
range of other stakeholders (Collinson, Cross, Ferguson, Power, & Stevenson, 2014). This, 
we suggest, is a matter of public interest (Riotto, 2008); highlighting the potentially critical 
role that research can play in informing policy-making debates. It is all the more a matter of 
public interest, we suggest, because the Greenbury provisions have been imported elsewhere, 
into other fields, including academia, where in the UK Vice Chancellors’ pay has become 
something of a cause célèbre, as top-earning academics have sought to emulate remuneration 
patterns typical of the private sector (Chakrabortty, 2017). Our study therefore represents a 
persuasive illustration of the limitations of neoliberal, ‘soft’ regulation, as epitomized by the 
Cadbury-inspired precept ‘comply or explain’ (Sikka & Stittle, 2018). 
Although ‘accountability’, alongside ‘transparency’ (Nielsen & Madsen, 2009), 
remain prominent shibboleths of present times, evidence from this research suggests that lack 
of effective accountability has contributed to widening the gap between top executive pay 
and the incomes of ordinary employees, with little appetite displayed for calling boards to 
account on pay levels per se. As in the US, ‘the outcry over excessive executive 
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compensation is not emanating from shareholders, but from other groups’ (Murphy & Jensen, 
2018, p. 3). Before the publication of the Greenbury provisions, King (1992, p. 9) noted that 
‘lack of accountability confers serious consequences. There is abuse of unchecked power 
[and] management is rewarding itself for bad performance’. It has been assumed for too long 
that all that needs to happen to enhance accountability is to increase the quality and quantity 
of information disclosed by companies to stakeholders, upon which information different 
constituencies can hold companies to account, for, say, failing to meet previously disclosed 
standards or similar. This assumption is contestable, however, inasmuch as a number of 
conditions need to be satisfied before an accountability relationship can be deemed to be 
effective. The increased heterogeneity of shareholdings among public companies has made 
meeting these conditions more problematic, such that the effective accountability of boards to 
shareholders has receded.  
Our micro-study of the backstage work of the elite actors responsible for elevating 
and perpetuating the myth that pay disclosure might increase the accountability of corporate 
executives and boards has afforded a rare opportunity closely to study the role of power and 
politics in corporate governance reform. At the beginning of this article we posed three 
research questions. First, how did the Greenbury committee come to recommend disclosure 
as the best means of justifying and controlling the remuneration of top corporate executives? 
Our answer is that the crisis of moral authority provoked by public antipathy towards 
runaway top executive pay stirred elite politicians and business leaders into action in defence 
of the UK system of corporate governance. Greenbury followed the US in proposing 
remuneration committees backed by disclosure as a readymade institutional fix justified 
discursively through a combination of three rhetorical strategies in support of incremental 
change, disclosure serving to restore the moral authority of UK corporate governance while 
obviating radical reform. Second, how do the knowledgeable agents responsible for the 
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Greenbury recommendations explain the post-Greenbury escalation in top executive pay? 
Our answer is that retrospectively they felt blindsided by the readiness of executives to game 
the system and break faith with an accountability relationship they had presumed was strong 
but in fact was weak and getting weaker. Committee members erroneously presumed that 
disclosure would have a shaming effect, but instead it heightened awareness of relativities 
and fed the calculation of self-interest. There is an element of moral self-justification in play 
here because the Greenbury recommendations ultimately were not inspired by ethics, but by 
elite solidarity in an ideological defence of self-regulation, on the basis that, as committee 
member F bluntly put it, ‘if Greenbury did not come up with some sensible recommendations 
then something else would get there first’. The committee made no attempt to control 
absolute levels of pay, but merely to shape who was involved in the pay-setting process. 
Third, how might our findings and those of other researchers contribute to achieving a more 
effective form of accountability? Our answer is that we contribute to discussions on corporate 
governance and accountability by demonstrating that the assumption that more disclosure 
leads automatically to increased accountability is erroneous. We suggest that disclosure post-
Greenbury has stimulated rather than moderated the ratcheting up of executive pay. 
Building on prior research (Cooper & Owen, 2007; Messner, 2009), we propose four 
conditions which we suggest should apply for this situation to be remedied. These conditions 
are: first, there should be an appetite to hold to account; second, the demand side should 
possess the requisite information with which to hold the supply side to account; third, there 
should be shared understanding against which demand side actors collectively agree to hold 
to account; and finally, the demand side must possess the necessary power of sanction to 
punish underperformance against agreed standards. Failure against these conditions may 
explain why the desired increased accountability in this area has failed to materialize thus far. 
What are the implications? Our research shows how the business elite of Britain and its 
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political allies exercise power through control of governance processes and the discourse of 
corporate governance, preserving self-regulation and limited state intervention as an ideal. 
The UK has become institutionally path dependent, wedded, as elsewhere, to the soft model 
of corporate governance introduced by Cadbury and progressively refined over three decades. 
The existing model of corporate governance based on agency assumptions now seems 
outdated, out of tune with the realities of twenty-first century capitalism, incapable of 
‘reining in or mitigating many of the imperfections, anomalies or fragilities of corporate 
behavior’ (Gendron, 2018, p. 2). With the balance of power in agency relationships 
seemingly having shifted in favour of agents (corporate executives and financial 
intermediaries) who extract high rates economic rents irrespective of performance, a more 
effective accountability relationship is little in evidence and a re-conception of that 
relationship seems long overdue (Clarke et al., 2018; Sikka & Stittle, 2018). How, then, 
might path-breaking reform be achieved? The main lesson of this research is that there is too 
much at stake in corporate governance to trust entirely in self-regulation. To deliver the four 
conditions for more effective governance specified here will require, given present trends, the 
establishment of a permanent corporate governance commission, representing multiple 
stakeholders, with convening power and the authority needed directly to call boards and top 
executives to account. Without central regulatory oversight and  enforcement, we can expect 
little more than cosmetic changes to the present system as the corporate elite conducts 
‘business as usual’, empowered by such institutionally embedded myths as pay-for-
performance, elevated by Greenbury and since perpetuated by a slew of insider reformers. 
We agree that ‘what is principally required is a cultural change’ to combat the ‘problems of 
short-termism, which is the essential precondition for change’ (Kay, 2017). We believe, 
however, that this can only be accomplished by potentially powerful others – politicians, 
unions, journalists and academics – acting in concert, exercising voice and engaging directly 
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in the struggle for a system of corporate governance that serves the many, not just the few. 
References 
 
Anderson, R.C., & Bizjak, J.M. (2003).  An empirical examination of the role of the CEO 
and the compensation committee in structuring executive pay. Journal of Banking & 
Finance, 27, 1323-1348. 
Basset, P. (1995). Will Greenbury balance the forces of greed and envy? The Times, 17 July. 
Bebchuk, L. & Fried, J. (2003). Executive compensation as an agency problem. Journal of 
Economic Perspectives, 17(3), 71–92. 
Bebchuk, L., & Fried, J. (2004). Pay without performance: The unfulfilled promise of 
executive compensation. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. 
Bender, R. (2003). How executive directors’ remuneration is determined in two FTSE 350 
utilities. Corporate governance: An International Review, 11(3), 206-217. 
Benston, G.J. (1982). Accounting and corporate accountability. Accounting, Organizations 
and Society, 7(2), 87-105. 
Bergstresser, D., & Philippon, T. (2006). CEO incentives and earnings management. Journal 
of Financial Economics, 80(3), 511-529. 
Black, J. (2002). Regulatory conversations. Journal of Law and Society, 29(1), 163-196. 
Bourdieu, P. (1996). The state nobility: Elite schools in the field of power, trans. L.C. Clough. 
Cambridge: Polity.  
Broadbent, J., Dietrich, M., & Laughlin, R. (1996). The development of principal-agent 
contracting and accountability relationships in the public sector: Conceptual and 
cultural problems. Critical Perspectives on Accounting, 7(3), 259-284. 
Buchanan, D., & Bryman, A. (2009). The Sage handbook of organizational research 
methods. London: Sage. 
Buck, T., Bruce, A., Main, B.G.M., & Udueni, H. (2003). Long term incentive plans, 
executive pay and UK company performance. Journal of Management Studies, 40(7), 
1709-1727. 
Burns, N., & Kedia, S. (2006). The impact of performance-based compensation on 
misreporting. Journal of Financial Economics, 79, 35-67. 
Cadbury, A. (1992). Report of the committee on the financial aspects of corporate 
governance. London: Gee. 
Cadbury, A. (2013). Foreword. In L, F. Spira & J. Slinn, The Cadbury committee: A history 
(pp. v-xii). Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Cadman, B., Carter, M.E., & Hillegeist, S. (2010). The incentives of compensation 
consultants and CEO pay. Journal of Economics and Accounting, 49, 263-280. 
Chakrabortty, A. (2017). The fat cats have got their claws into our universities and will eat 
them up. The Guardian, 28 November 2017, 
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/nov/28/fat-cats-britains-
universities-vice-chancellors-salaries-pay. Accessed 14 May 2018. 
CIPD (2018). Executive pay: Review of FTSE 100 executive pay. London: CIPD. 
Clarke, T., Jarvis, C., & Gholamshahi, S. (2018). The impact of corporate governance on 
compounding inequality: Maximising shareholder value and inflating executive pay. 
Critical Perspectives on Accounting, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cpa.2018.06.002. 
Collinson, D., Cross, S., Ferguson, J., Power, D., & Stevenson, L. (2014). Financialization 
and company law: A study of the UK Company Law Review. Critical Perspectives 
on Accounting, 25(1), 5-16. 
 43 
Conyon, M. (1995). Directors’ pay in the privatized utilities. British Journal of Industrial 
Relations, 33(2), 159-171. 
Conyon, M., Peck, S.I., & Sadler, G. (2009). Compensation consultants and executive pay: 
Evidence from the United States and United Kingdom. Academy of Management 
Perspectives, 23(1), 43-55. 
Conyon, M., & Sadler, G. (2010). Shareholder voting and directors' remuneration report 
legislation: Say on pay in the UK. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 
18(4), 649–667. 
Cooper, S.M., & Owen, D. (2007). Corporate social reporting and stakeholder accountability: 
The missing link. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 32(7-8), 296-312. 
Cornett, M.M., Marcus, A.J., & Tehranian, H. (2008). Corporate governance and pay-for-
performance: The impact of earnings management. Journal of Financial Economics, 
87(2), 357-373. 
Craighead, J.A., Magnan, M.L., & Thorne, L. (2004). The impact of mandated disclosure on 
performance-based compensation. Contemporary Accounting Research, 21(2), 369-
398. 
Davis, N.Z. (1983). The return of Martin Guerre. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University 
Press. 
Day, P., & Klein, R. (1987). Accountabilities: Five public services. London: Tavistock. 
Denzin, N.K., & Lincoln, Y.S. (2005). The Sage handbook of qualitative research. London: 
Sage. 
Dexter, L.A. (2006). Elite and specialized interviewing. London: ECPR Press. 
Dillard, J., & Vinnari, E. (2017). A case study of critique: Critical perspectives on critical 
accounting. Critical Perspectives on Accounting, 43, 88-109. 
DiMaggio, P., & Powell, W. (1983). The iron cage revisited: Institutional isomorphism and 
collective rationality in organizational fields. American Sociological Review, 48(2), 
147-160.Dimson, E., & Karakas, O. (2015). Active ownership. Review of Financial 
Studies, 28(12), 3225-3268. 
Dong, M., & Ozkan, A. (2008). Institutional investors and director pay: An empirical study 
of UK companies. Journal of Multinational Financial Management, 18, 16-29. 
Empson, L. (2018). Elite interviewing in professional organizations. Journal of Professions 
and Organization, 5, 58-68. 
Everett, J., Neu, D., & Rahaman, A.S. (2008). Accounting and the global fight against 
corruption. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 32(6), 513-542.  
Ezzamel, M., & Watson, R. (1998). Market comparison earnings and the bidding-up of 
executive cash compensation: Evidence from the United Kingdom. Academy of 
Management Journal, 41(2), 221-231. 
Fama, E., & Jensen, M. (1983). Separation of ownership and control, Journal of Law and 
Economics, 26(2), 301-325. 
Fairclough, N. (2003). Analysing discourse: Textual analysis for social research. London: 
Routledge. 
Flyvbjerg,   B. (2001). Making social science  matter. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Forker, J.J. (1992). Corporate governance and disclosure quality. Accounting and Business 
Research, 22(86), 111-124. 
Gabaix, X.,  & Landier, A. (2008). Why has CEO pay inceased so much? The Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, 123(1), 49-100. 
Gendron, Y. (2018). Beyond conventional boundaries: Corporate governance as inspiration 
for critical accounting research. Critical Perspectives on Accounting, 55, 1-11. 
Ginzburg, C. (2013a). The cheese and the worms: The cosmos of a sixteenth-century miller. 
 44 
Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. 
Gioia, D.A., Corley, K.G., & Hamilton, A.L. (2012). Seeking qualitative rigor in inductive 
research: Notes on the Gioia methodology. Organizational Research Methods, 16(1), 
15-31. 
Golant, B.D., Sillince, J.A.A., Harvey, C., & Maclean, M. (2015). Rhetoric of stability and 
change: The organizational identity work of institutional leadership. Human 
Relations, 68(4), 607-631. 
Gray, R.H. (1991). Accounting and environmentalism: An exploration of the challenge of 
gently accounting for accountability, transparency and sustainability. Accounting, 
Organizations and Society, 17(5), 399-425. 
Gray, R., Bebbington, J., & Collison, D. (2006). NGOs, civil society and accountability: 
Making the people accountable to capital. Accounting, Auditing & Accountability 
Journal, 19(3), 319–348. 
Gray, R., Owen, D., & Adams, C. (1996). Accounting and accountability: Changes and 
challenges in corporate social and environmental reporting. London: Prentice Hall. 
Greenbury, R. (1995). Directors’ remuneration: Report of a study group chaired by Sir 
Richard Greenbury. London: Gee. 
Gregg, P., Jewell, S., & Tonks, I., (2012). Executive pay and performance: Did bankers’ 
bonuses cause the crisis? International Review of Finance, 12(1), 89-122. 
Gregory-Smith, I. (2012). Chief executive pay and remuneration committee independence. 
Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, 74(4), 510-531. 
Harris, J.D. (2009). What’s wrong with executive compensation? Journal of Business Ethics, 
85(s.1), 147-156. 
Harris, J.D., & Bromiley, P. (2007). Incentives to cheat: The influence of executive 
compensation and firm performance on financial misrepresentation. Organization 
Science, 18(3), 350-367. 
Hartzell, J.C., & Starks, L.T. (2003). Institutional investors and executive compensation. 
Journal of Finance, 58(6), 2351-2374. 
Hayes, R.M., & Schaefer, S. (2009). CEO pay and the Lake Wobegon effect. Journal of 
Financial Economics, 94(2), 280-290. 
Healy, P.M. & Pelepu, K.G. (2003). The fall of Enron. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 
17(2), 3-26. 
Hendry, J., Sanderson, P., Barker, R., & Roberts, J. (2006). Owners or traders? 
Conceptualizations of institutional investors and their relationship with corporate 
managers. Human Relations, 59(8), 1101-1132. 
Heseltine, M. (2000). Life in the jungle. London: Coronet. 
High Pay Centre (2013). One rule for them. London: High Pay Centre. 
Jensen, M.C., & Murphy, K.J. (1990). Performance pay and top-management incentives. 
Journal of Political Economy, 98(2), 225-264. 
Jensen, M.C., & Murphy, K.J. (2004). Remuneration: Where we’ve been, how we got to 
here, what are the problems, and how to fix them. . ECGI Working Paper Series in 
Finance, 44/2004. 
Jones, I., & Pollitt, M. (2004). Understanding how issues in corporate governance develop: 
Cadbury report to Higgs review. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 
12(2), 162-171. 
Jørgensen, M.W., & Phillips, L.J. (2002). Discourse analysis as theory and method. London: 
Sage. 
Kay, J. (2012). The Kay review of UK equity markets and long term decision making. 
London: Crown. 
 45 
Kay, J. (2017). Corporate governance: BEIS Select Committee written evidence, 
https://www.johnkay.com/2017/01/16/corporate-governance-beis-select-committee-
written-evidence/. 
King, G.R. (1992). Back to accountability. Management Decision, 30(3), 9-11. 
Li, W. & Young, S. (2016). An analysis of CEO pay arrangements and value creation for 
FTSE-350 companies. London: CFA UK. 
Leong, S., & Hazelton, J. (2019). Under what conditions is mandatory disclosure most likely 
to cause organisational change? Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal, 
https://doi.org/10.1108/AAAJ-12-2015-2361.Lowenthal, D. (2015). The past is a 
foreign country revisited. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Maclean, M. (1999). Corporate governance in France and the UK: Long-term perspectives on 
contemporary institutional arrangements. Business History, 41(1), 88-116. 
Maclean, M., Harvey, C., & Chia, R. (2010). Dominant corporate agents and the power elite 
in France and Britain. Organization Studies, 31(3), 327-348. 
Maclean, M., Harvey, C., & Chia, R. (2012). Sensemaking, storytelling and the legitimization 
of elite business careers. Human Relations, 65(1): 17-40. 
Maclean, M., Harvey, C., & Clegg, S.R. (2016). Conceptualizing historical organization 
studies. Academy of Management Review, 41(3), 609-632. 
Maclean, M., Harvey, C., & Press, J. (2006). Business elites and corporate governance in 
France and the UK. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Main, B.G.M., & Johnston, J. (1993). Remuneration committees and corporate governance. 
Accounting and Business Research, 23(91A), 351-362. 
Maitland, A. (2008). Reporting and explaining the deal communicating remuneration policy. 
In C. Arrowsmith & R. McNeil (Eds.), Reward governance for senior executives (pp. 
154-180). London: Law Practitioner Series.  
Malsch, B., Tremblay, M.S., & Gendron, Y. (2012). Sense-making in compensation 
committees: A cultural theory perspective. Organization Studies, 33(3), 389-421. 
McCahery, J.A., Sautner, Z., & Starks, L.T. (2016). Behind the scenes: The corporate 
governance preferences of institutional investors. Journal of Finance, 71(6), 2905-
2932. 
McNulty, T., & Nordberg, D. (2016). Ownership, activism and engagement: Institutional 
investors as active owners. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 24(3), 
346-358. 
Messner, M. (2009). The limits of accountability. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 
34(8), 918-938. 
Mowbray, N. (1995). Dear Sir Richard Greenbury. The Independent, 25 July 1995. 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/dear-sir-richard-greenbury-1593084.html. 
Accessed 19 April 2018. 
Mueller, F., & Whittle, A. (2011). Translating management ideas: A discursive devices 
analysis. Organization Studies, 32(2), 187-210. 
Murphy, K.J. & Jensen, M.C. (2018). The politics of pay: The unintended consequences of 
regulating executive compensation. USC Gould Center for Law and Social Science 
Research Paper Series, 18-8. 
Murphy, K.J., & Sandino, T. (2010). Executive pay and ‘‘independent’’ compensation 
consultants. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 49, 247-262. 
Nielsen, C., & Madsen, M.T. (2009). Discourses of transparency in the intellectual capital 
reporting debate: Moving from generic reporting models to management defined 
information. Critical Perspectives on Accounting, 20, 847-854. 
 46 
Nordberg, D., & McNulty, T. (2013). Creating better boards through codification: 
Posshisibilities and limitations in UK corporate governance, 1992–2010. Business 
History, 55(3), 348-374. 
Office for National Statistics (2012). Ownership of UK quoted shares 2012. 
http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/dcp171778_327674.pdf. Accessed 13 June 2018. 
Oulton, C. (1991). An ordinary Dulwich man earning pounds 1 a minute: The smile of a boss 
whose pay keeps on going up and up. The Independent, 9 June 1991, p.  3. 
Pepper, A., Gore, J., & Crossman, A. (2013). Are long-term incentive plans an effective and 
efficient way of motivating senior executives? Human Resource Management 
Journal, 23(1), 36-51. 
Price, M., Harvey, C. Maclean, M., & Campbell, D.J. (2018). From Cadbury to Kay: 
Discourse, intertextuality and the evolution of UK corporate governance. Accounting, 
Auditing & Accountability Journal, 31(5), 1542-1562. 
Rice, G. (2010). Reflections on interviewing elites. Area, 42(1), 70-75. 
Riotto, J.J. (2008). Understanding the Sarbanes-Oxley Act: A value added approach for 
public interest. Critical Perspectives on Accounting, 19(7), 952-962. 
Roberts, J. (2009). No one is perfect: The limits of transparency and an ethic for ‘intelligent’ 
accountability. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 34(8), 957-970. 
Roberts, J., & Scapens, R. (1985). Accounting systems and systems of accountability – 
understanding accounting practices in their organisational contexts. Accounting, 
Organizations and Society, 10(4), 443-456. 
Rogers, P. (2014). Theory of change: Methodological briefs. Florence: UNICEF. 
Sapp, S.G. (2008). The impact of corporate governance on executive remuneration. European 
Financial Management, 14(4), 710-746. 
Shan, Y., & Walter, T. (2016). Towards a set of design principles for executive compensation 
contracts. Abacus, 52(4), 619-684. 
Sheehan, K.M. (2012). The regulation of executive compensation: Greed, accountability and 
say on pay. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing. 
Shrives, P.J., & Brennan, N.M. (2017). Explanations for corporate governance non-
compliance: A rhetorical analysis. Critical Perspectives on Accounting, 49, 31-56. 
Sikka, P., & Stittle, J. (2018). Debunking the myth of shareholder ownership of companies: 
Some implications for corporate governance and financial reporting. Critical 
Perspectives on Accounting, , https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cpa.2017.03.011. 
Spira, L.F.  & Slinn, J. (2013). The Cadbury committee: A history. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
Strauss, A.L., & Corbin, J.M. (1998). Basics of qualitative research: Techniques and 
procedures for developing grounded theory. London: Sage. 
Suddaby, R., & Greenwood, R. (2005). Rhetorical strategies of legitimacy. Administrative 
Science Quarterly, 50(1), 35-67. 
Suddaby, R., Foster, W.M., & Quinn Trank, C. (2010). Rhetorical history as a source of 
competitive advantage. Advances in Strategic Management, 27, 147-173. 
Sun, J., Cahan, S.F., & Emanuel, D. (2009). Compensation committee governance quality, 
chief executive officer stock option grants, and future firm performance. Journal of 
Banking & Finance, 33, 1507-1519. 
Tanggaard, L. (2007). The research interview as discourses crossing swords: The researcher 
and apprentice on crossing roads. Qualitative Inquiry, 13(1), 160-176. 
Thompson, S. (2005). The impact of corporate governance reforms on the remuneration of 
executives in the UK. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 13(1), 19-25. 
Tilba, A., & McNulty, T. (2013). Engaged versus disengaged ownership: The case of pension 
funds in the UK. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 21(2), 165-182. 
 47 
Tremblay, M.-S. (2012). Illusions of control: The extension of new public management 
through corporate governance regulation. Financial Accountability and Management, 
28(4), 395-416. 
Ward, V. (1995). Cedric Brown, fat cat in the dog house. The Independent, 12 April 1995, p. 
17. 
Weiss, G., & Wodak, R. (2007). Critical discourse analysis. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Westphal, J.D., & Zajac, E.J. (1994). Substance and symbolism in CEOs’ long-term incentive 
plans. Administrative Science Quarterly, 39(1), 367-390. 
Wong, S.C.Y. (2010). Why stewardship is proving elusive for institutional investors. 




Tables and Figures 
 
Table 1. Analytical processes in micro-historical organizational research 
Process Purpose Product 




Contextualizing Locating events in their situated context(s) Contextually situated 
narrative 
Exploring Seeking causal connections between actors, 
actions, events and outcomes 
Causally explained 
narrative 





Table 2. Greenbury committee actors and elite positions 
Actor Name Corporate Role(s) in 1995 Extra-Corporate Role(s) in 
1995 
Members 
Greenbury, Sir Richard 
Interviewed 
Chairman and CEO, Marks & Spencer 
plc; Non-Executive Director (NED), 
AstraZeneca plc; NED, Lloyds Bank 
plc 
Trustee, Royal Academy; Trustee, 
Samaritans 
Angus, Sir Michael 
Not interviewed (d. 2010) 
Chairman, Whitbread plc;  Chairman, 
Boots plc; NED, British Airways plc, 
NED, National Westminster Bank, plc; 
NED Royal Automobile Club Holdings 
Ltd 
Governor, London Stock Exchange;  
Member, European Round Table of 
Industrialists 
Chapman, Sir David 
Interviewed 
Wise Speke Ltd (Stockbrokers) 
Newcastle; NED, Brewin Dolphin 
[wealth management]  
Chairman, Confederation of British 
Industries (CBI) North East Regional 
Advancement Group; Board, 
Northumbria Coalition Against 
Crime 
Henderson, Sir Denys 
Not interviewed (too ill to 
participate at the time of 
the interviews) 
Chairman, Rank Organisation plc; 
NED, Barclays plc; NED, Rio Tinto-
Zinc Corporation plc; NED, 
Schlumberger Ltd; Director, Market 
and Opinion Research International Ltd 
Chairman, Crown Estate Board of 
Commissioners; Board, CBI; 
Member: European Round Table of 
Industrialists 
Lees, Sir David 
Interviewed 
Chairman, GKN plc; NED, Tate & 
Lyle plc; NED, Courtaulds plc; NED, 
Westland Group plc; NED, AkzoNobel 
Ltd 
Board, CBI; Member, European 
Round Table of Industrialists; Board, 





Head of UK Institutional Investment, 
JP Morgan Investment Management 
Ltd 
Chairman, National Association of 
Pension Funds Investment 
Committee; Board, Chartered 
Financial Analyst Institute 
Melville-Ross, Tim 
Interviewed 
NED, Monument Oil and Gas Ltd Director-General, Institute of 
Directors 
Metcalfe, George 
Not interviewed (d. 2012) 
Chairman & CEO, UMECO plc; NED, 
Sailport plc 
Board, CBI 
Simon, Sir David 
Interviewed 
Chairman, British Petroleum plc Member, European Round Table of 
Industrialists 
Vallance, Sir Iain 
Provided written answers 
to questions 
Chairman, British Telecommunications 
plc; NED [vice-chairman], Royal Bank 
of Scotland; NED, Mobil Corp. 
Board, CBI; Board, Business in the 
Community; Board, British-
American Chamber of Commerce; 




CEO, Clerical Medical Investment 
Group; NED, JP Morgan Claverhouse 
Investment Trust 






 Deputy Secretary, UK Treasury; 
Board, Royal Opera House 
Grieves, John 
Not interviewed 
Senior Partner, Freshfields [legal 
practice] 
Board, British Invisibles [promotion 
of financial services overseas ] 
Jeffcote, Peter 
Not interviewed 





Chairman & CEO, Maitland 
[communications consultancy]  
Board, Investor Relations Society 
Carney, John 
Interviewed 






KPMG [professional services]  
NB. Please note that the alphabetical letters used in the text to identify committee members do not reflect the 
order in which interviewees are enumerated here. 
 
Table 3. Greenbury discourse of remuneration disclosure 






• The major problem was the privatized utilities … emerging from 
monopolistic positions … where huge sums of money were being paid 
out.’ PA, A. 
• ‘There were two abuses; one was the money former civil servants made 
out of the privatization of the utilities, and the other was very large 




•  ‘Contracts were not clear enough at that stage and they needed 
tightening up, specifically as regards the notice period.’ CM,D 
• ‘Contracts had to be made shorter and if they weren’t shorter, 




• ‘The solution was not to put in loads of legislation, which would have 
been a pointless exercise, but to be totally transparent about it all in 
terms of disclosure.’ PA,B 
• ‘The spiel to me was we really have to make sure this is being handled 
in political terms before someone takes it out of our hands and makes 






• ‘Friedman says that any money that gets paid out to anyone other than 
shareholders is theft from the shareholders and that is a very reasonable 
approach.’ CM,A 
• ‘The impact a chief executive can have on a FTSE 100 company is 
absolutely enormous … you pay what you have to pay. I would not be 
concerned about the overall level on which they’re paid.’ PA,C 
Normalizing 
assumptions 
• ‘On the principle that something must be done, the committee went with 
the recommendation of greater disclosure, simple as that.’ CM,B 
• ‘For me the key element was that bonuses should be subject to 
“challenging performance criteria”.’ CM, G 
Appealing to 
principle 
• ‘A self-regulatory process which says comply or explain seems to me to 
be quite sensible.’ CM, F 
• ‘Greenbury is self-regulation and I was aware that if [we] had not come 






• ‘We collected a group of people who represented all the interests – big 
shareholders, small shareholders – we had top people from every walk 
of life.’ CM,C 
• ‘I just think they wanted a guy like me involved as I was running [big 
company]. I probably had as much experience as only 3 or 4 people in 





Figure 1. Highest paid director in UK companies, 1980-2013* 
 













































































































































Claim: We are the 
right people to 
further improve 






Claim: We have a 
problem but it is 




Claim: The best 
solution is to 
make the existing 
regime more 
robust. 
Greenbury Argumentation Structure 
Figure 2. Discursive construction of disclosure as an institutional fix 
